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Sibley Lecture, March 1994
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE "SOVEREIGNTY"
Louis Henkin*
For us, disposed to commemoration (and committed to the decimal
system), the approaching turn of the 20th century, and of a half-century of
human rights, inspires celebration. It also invites inventory. It would be
fitting to look back upon the International Human Rights Movement-from
its conception during the Second World War and its birth at Nuremberg and
San Francisco (1945), through its troubled, frustrating years during the Cold
War, to its promises in the changed world order-and to take stock of its
remarkable successes and discouraging failures. Others might be inspired to
project a human rights agenda for the next century' and a program designed
to remove the abiding defects in international human rights standards and the
daunting obstacles to their effective implementation.
A student of international law and politics might venture a "retrospective"
of a different character. I suggest that a half-century of human rights has
been the cause, or the result, or both, of radical change in the international
state system, in the character of international law, and in its relation to
national constitutions and to the spread of "constitutionalism." Those
changes, I conclude, have undermined common assumptions about the state
system, including the assumed axiom of the system: state "sovereignty."
Elsewhere, I have expressed the view that, as applied to states in the
international system, "sovereignty" is a mistake, indeed a mistake built upon
mistakes, which has barnacled an unfortunate mythology.2 A political idea
describing the locus of ultimate legitimate authority in national society,
"sovereignty" has been transmuted into an axiom of the inter-state system,
which has become a barrier to international governance, to the growth of
international law, and to the realization of human values. I suggested the
need to "deconstruct" the concept, strip it of its myth, identify its essentials,

* University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University. This paper is adapted from the
John A. Sibley Lecture, delivered at The University of Georgia Law School, March 4, 1994.
' See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NExT CENTURY (Louis Henkin &
John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
2 Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEwSL., Mar. 1993,
reprinted in Proceedings of the Canadian Council of International Law, Oct. 1992.
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retain only its valuable values.
In these pages I suggest that a principal cause-or beneficiary-of
derogations from the mythology of sovereignty has been the International
Human Rights Movement, with important impact on the international
political system, and on international law as we have long learned and taught
it.
THE ASSUMPTIONS OF "SOVEREIGNTY"
Among the traditional assumptions sometimes deemed implicit in
international "sovereignty," one might identify the following:
-that the state system is committed exclusively to state values,
principally to state autonomy and the impermeability of state
territory, and to the welfare of the state as a monolithic entity;
-that international law is based on the consent of states, and is
made only by states and only for states;
-that the international system and international law do not (may
not) address what goes on within a state; in particular, how a state
treats its own inhabitants is no one else's business, not the business
of the system, not the business of any other state;
-- that a state may concern itself with what goes on inside another
state only as that impinges on its own state interests. (Therefore, a
state may presume to afford "diplomatic protection" to its diplomats
or its nationals, not to other human beings.)
-that international law cannot be "enforced": a state can only be
persuaded, induced, to honor its international obligations and will do
so only when it is in its national interest to do so;
-that a state's sovereignty shields its constitutional system from

international influences.
My thesis in these pages is that a half-century of international human
rights reflects--or has effected-important derogations from those assumptions. In particular:
-that the international system, still very much a system of independent states, has moved beyond state values towards human values 3
3 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES (1995).
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and towards commitment to human welfare broadly conceived;
-that an international law of human rights has penetrated the onceimpermeable state entity and now addresses the condition of human
rights within every state;
-that the international law of human rights now includes important
norms to which some states have not consented;
-that the international system has developed institutions for
enforcing human rights law against "sovereign" states and has
sometimes encouraged states to "intervene" in other states in support
of human rights;
-that international law has importantly influenced-and been
influenced by-national constitutions and constitutional systems.
THE CHANGING VALUES OF THE STATE SYSTEM
At mid-century, the international system began a slow, hesitant move from
state values towards human values. Until the Second World War, the system
of states was a "liberal" system of independent, "impermeable," "monolithic"
states. Its cardinal principle, and its principal value, was that states should
leave each other alone. At mid-century, after terrible war, the system
produced unprecedented law to that end: the United Nations Charter (Article
2(4)) outlawed war and other uses of force by any state against the territorial
integrity or political independence of another state.
I do not suggest that commitment to the principle that states should be let
alone did not inure to the benefit of individual human beings. Wars did not
only overwhelm states; they killed people. Conquest by another state did not
overwhelm only state interests; being conquered did not commonly bring to
the inhabitants less misery, more benign rule, greater democracy, or better
conditions of living. But the benefits of a system in which states were let
alone were seen in state terms, with the individual an incidental, indirect
beneficiary, and often not a beneficiary at all.4
At mid-century, the international system also took large steps towards a law of
cooperation. Bretton Woods produced international financial institutions-the World Bank,
and the International Monetary Fund. Other specialized agencies, UNESCO, WHO et al.,
were created to promote other interests. Older treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation were supplemented and, to a significant extent, replaced by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Again, in this law of cooperation the participants
were states, the policies were determined by the states, the anticipated benefits were seen in
4

state terms; the human being, individual or in groups, was, at most, an indirect beneficiary.
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Simultaneously, however, in a radical departure, the United Nations
Charter heralded also the birth of international human rights. In the
preamble to the Charter, the peoples of the United Nations reaffirmed "faith
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small."
Article 1 of the Charter declared it to be one of the purposes of the United
Nations to achieve international cooperation in "promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." By Article
56 of the Charter all member states pledged themselves to take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
that purpose. The institutions projected by the Charter included a commission for the promotion of human rights (Article 68).
Thus, 1945 saw a small but clear, firm, bold step from state values toward
human values, a small but clear derogation from state "sovereignty." The
condition of human rights became a subject of international concern in
principle, as well as, in fact, to an increasing extent. Slowly, imperceptibly,
how any state treated any human being became, in principle and to some
extent in fact, "of international concern," everybody's business. The
international law of human rights penetrated the state monolith beyond
repair.
The U.N. Charter pledged states to promote respect for human rights but
it did not define them. Perhaps, in the wake of Adolf Hitler and the
Holocaust, the framers assumed that human rights needed no definition. But
the demand for an International Bill of Rights required that human rights be
identified. For at least some of the "framers" of the Charter, human rights
meant "liberal" rights, the rights of the individual in a liberal state. But
almost from the beginning, the international law of human rights followed
the movement within states from "the liberal state" to "the welfare state."
In the years before the Second World War, for example, U.S. President
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, drawing on European example, took the
United States in small steps towards the welfare state. Then, in 1941,
President Roosevelt proclaimed the "Four Freedoms," later accepted as
Allied war aims, which included prominently "freedom from want."5 After
the War, moreover, the international system itself inched toward becoming
a "welfare system." By 1948, the international system was evincing concern

'See President's Message to Congress, 87 CONG. REc. 44, 46-47 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1941).
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not only for victims of genocide and torture, but also of hunger; 6 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared equal respect for what came
to be known as "economic and social rights" as for "civil and political
rights." In time, the international system proclaimed "a right to development."7 If, in principle, foreign assistance has remained voluntary, not a
matter of binding obligation, the system, if not the law, has come to
recognize such assistance as not pure altruism, but as a political and moral
obligation.
The move from state values to human values, from a liberal state system
to a welfare system, is hardly complete or universally accepted. But, I am
satisfied, it is undeniable, irresistible, irreversible.
THE CHANGING SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

International law, our law schools teach, derives from two principal
"sources": customary law and treaty Customary law derives from state
practice;9 treaties are made by agreement between states."' At bottom, it
has been assumed, both depend on state consent, a strong reflection of state
autonomy, "sovereignty." Of course, the requirement of consent is an
obstacle to international regulation or governance. It favors laissez-faire, or,
at best, law reflecting the common denominator of general agreement.
Hence, international law is often described as "primitive.""
Once, not long ago, international law was essentially customary law, most
of it "vintage" law, long established. In the second half of the 20th century,
law has been made principally by multilateral treaty, but most of that treatylaw was laid upon a bed of custom: the United Nations, principally through

6

The U.N. General Assembly adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment

of the
Crime of Genocide on December 9, 1948, the Universal Declaration on December 10.
7
Declarationon the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 128, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 97th
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/128 (1987).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102(1) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
9 "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." Id. § 102(2).
"oVienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, arts.
6-80, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
" Even the law of "cooperation" which mushroomed after the Second World War was
designed to promote cooperation, not to prescribe it, and had limited normative impact,
aiming to protect state autonomy rather than to limit it. See supra note 4.
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the International Law Commission, pursued a program of "codification and
development" of customary law by multilateral treaty, such treaties generally
reflecting much codification and some development."
New states, the
majority of the states in the system today, joined the process of codification
and development, but they could not escape previously established customary
law, the rules of the "club" they had eagerly joined. All states, old and new,
however, could refuse to be bound by newly developing customary law; the
foundation of the law appeared to remain "consent," or at least "nondissent."' 3
Human rights law has shaken the sources of international law, reshaped
its character, enlarged its domain. Human rights law is all new law, at most
half a century old. 14 Human rights law has been established largely by
treaty-the U.N. Charter and international human rights covenants and
conventions-but without any foundation or context of custom. Human
rights treaties continue to increase, a reflection of the system's steady drift
toward human values. It is a reflection, too, of the new sensitivity of states
and of the state system to pressures leading to consent. It is perhaps the
only instance 5 of a new body of international law born and grown in
response to an idea, to public opinion-domestic and international opinion.'

6

There are now two major covenants and a growing number of conventions,17 and both covenants and many conventions are widely ratified. But

" Similarly, in the United States, the nineteenth century saw much statutory codification
and some development of the common law.
" By the "persistent objector" principle, a state that maintains its refusal to accept a
principle of customary law during the process of its development is not bound by it. See
RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 102 cmt. d.
" The ILO began to promote labor conventions after the First World War. See supra
note 4 and infra note 18.
IS Humanitarian law, the law designed to "humanize" war, was an earlier but narrower
instance.
16 That is the subject of the Colloquium at The University of Georgia School of Law,
March 4-5, 1994, the papers of which are published in this issue of the Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law.
7
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature December
19, 1966,999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
opened for signature December 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. As of early 1995 some 25 human
rights conventions sponsored by the United Nations were in force. There are also well over
a hundred conventions on conditions of labor and other social welfare issues sponsored by the
International Labor Organization (ILO). Other specialized agencies of the United Nations,
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some states have resisted adhering to those treaties, notably the United
States, as well as some of the worst offenders against human rights, e.g.,
South Africa (until recently), and the People's Republics of China. Also, too
many of the adherences to the covenants and conventions are riddled with
reservations.
Hence the pressure, beginning at Nuremberg in 1945,8 to develop and
achieve recognition for a "customary," "non-conventional" law of human
rights (i.e., law not made by treaty) and there is now a significant, and
increasing, amount of such non-conventional law of human rights. 9 But
though that law is not made by treaty, it is not "customary law" as once
conceived; surely, it differs from traditional customary law in fundamental
respects. Traditional customary law was not made; it resulted. Most of it
was "always" there, in the "constitutional" law implicit in the conception of
a system of states; in ancient custom antedating the modern state system; in
a "common law" grown from the middle ages. That law was in place, the
practice of states did not create it, state practice recognized the law as having
happened.' Now, in our time, non-conventional law is being made,
purposefully, knowingly, wilfully, and concern for human rights has provided
a principal impetus to its growth, and the law of human rights is a principal
instance of such non-conventional law.
And so, the Restatement declares that a state violates international law
when it practices, encourages or condones any one of a series of human
rights violations: genocide, slavery, extra-judicial killings or disappearances,
torture or other inhuman treatment or punishment, systematic racial
discrimination.2" The Restatement comments that there may be nonconventional human rights law in addition to that which it was prepared to

e.g., UNESCO, have also sponsored human rights conventions.
'aThe Nuremberg Charter and the indictments under it charged Nazi leaders with, inter
alia, crimes against humanity, not based on any treaty. See Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, August 8, 1945, 82
U.N.T.S. 279; Formulation of the Principles recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal & in the Judgement of the Tribunal, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN 4/5 (1949). The
Nuremberg principles were unanimously affirmed by the U.N. General Assembly. G.A. Res.
95(1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., Part 11,55th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946).
")See HENKIN, supra note 3, at 29 et seq.
20Hence, we commonly define customary law as built by practice opinio juris, with a
sense of legal obligation. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Practice with a sense of
legal obligation can only exist if there is law before the practice.
21RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 702.
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recognize
and restate at the time, and that more such law would doubtless
22
come.
Where does this law come from? The Restatement, product of a
conservative institution' and seeking the widest acceptance and recognition,
supports the non-conventional human rights law it restates by invoking the
traditional indicia of traditional customary law-state practice with a sense
of legal obligation. But the Reporters of the Restatement admitted that the
state practice supporting non-conventional human rights law looks different,
is different.' Skeptics might insist that the non-conventional law of human
rights is not "customary" in any traditional sense; it is not based on ancient
axioms, or on traditional natural law, or on Roman law; it is not based on
"custom" or on state practice at all.
Rather, I suggest, such law is "constitutional," in a new sense.' The
international system, having identified contemporary human values, has
adopted and declared them to be fundamental law, international law. But,
in a radical derogation from the axiom of "sovereignty," that law is not
based on consent: at least, it does not honor or accept dissent, and it binds
particular states regardless of their objection.
How did this happen? Conceptually, it may have sneaked into the law on
the back of another idea, "ius cogens." At some time after the Second
World War, the system accepted that there is supreme, peremptory law of
greater weight than treaty or traditional customary law.' lus cogens, too,
is sometimes described as customary law and it is surely non-conventional
(not made by treaty), but it is not customary in any other sense: it does not
reflect ancient custom or traditional natural law; it has not been built by state
practice. Also, it does not require consent of every state: it reflects
"general" consensus, not unanimity; it binds the exceptional "eccentric"
dissenter; the "persistent objector" principle does not apply.27
And so, international non-conventional human rights law is ius cogens, or
is like ius cogens.U Indeed, if it is ius cogens, it may be the only example
22 id § 702 cmt. a, note 1; see also infra note 32.
23

The

Institute.

RESTATEMENT

is prepared and published under the auspices of the American Law

24 RESTATEMENT, supra

note 8, § 701, n.2.

5 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
26 See Vienna Convention, supra note 10, at arts. 53, 64;
§ 331(2) cmts. e, f.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
" RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 702 cmt. n.

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 8,
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of ius cogens that has had universal acceptance as well as universal
application.2 9 As ius cogens (or a close kin), it is not the result of practice
but the product of common consensus from which few dare dissent. And the
few who might dare are compelled to obey, the cost of living in the state
system at the end of the 20th century.
Why did this happen? I am persuaded that the principal catalyst for this
radical derogation from "sovereignty," this change in the politics of the
system and in international human rights law, was the universal reaction to
apartheidin South Africa. The Third World led, and others followed, in
declaring apartheidintolerable, and they changed the rules of law-making in
order to outlaw it: the lack of "practice," the persistent objection of the
Republic of South Africa (the state principally affected) were no obstacle.
Then the system swept under the new principle the crime of genocide, which
no one dared justify. Slavery (unfortunately not yet eradicated) followed,
since no state has dared claim that it is right and lawful to practice or to
tolerate it. Similarly, no state dared assert a right to commit extra-judicial
killing or disappearance, or to practice torture or inhuman treatment. And
so, states have been prepared to outlaw these in principle (even if some
states may practice them in fact), and we have non-conventional human
rights law. And there may already be (or may soon be) additional nonconventional rights which the Restatement was too cautious to recognize:
rights to property, to gender equality, freedom from religious discrimination,
and, in the changed world order after the Cold War, to democracy, even to
some measure of individual autonomy in general and of freedom of
30
enterprise.
THE NATIONAL RoOTS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

International human rights law is a revolutionary penetration of the onceimpermeable state. But beyond the radical character of international human
rights law in principle, the content of that law has drawn on (and in turn
permeated) once-excluded sources, the domestic constitutional systems of
states.

29

The law of the U.N. Charter outlawing the use of force between states is commonly

cited as an agreed principle of ius cogens. Id. at § 102 cmts. h, k. However, the character
of the Charter as superior law was explicitly provided in the Charter itself (Article 103),
before a general doctrine of ius cogens was recognized.
30 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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It began with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, soon a half
century old, one of Ihe most important, most influential international
instruments of the century.3' The Declaration did not draw on old international sources, or on ancient notions of natural law, or on Roman law, or on
modern sources of international politics, not even on the 18th-19th century
"international standard of justice" for foreign nationals.32 Rather, it derives
wholly from contemporary national sources. For the rights that have been
denominated "civil and political rights," the Declaration drew on liberal
national constitutions, such as that of the United States (as interpreted in
hundreds of volumes of the U.S. Supreme Court Reports), as well as on
European constitutions and laws. For "economic and social rights" it drew
on the welfare systems initiated in the 19th century by Western European
states. 3 Tired controversies, and political sniping, should not be allowed
to conceal the essential consensus (by states East and West, North and
South) that international law includes both "generations" of rights. The
Universal Declaration recognizes civil and political, and economic and social
rights equally, and all these rights are "universal": all are rights of all
human beings, all are accepted by all states. Both categories have been
converted into legally binding covenants; at least some of each have become,
or have contributed to, non-conventional ("customary") law.
International human rights derive from national constitutional rights.'
The international law of human rights and national constitutional law inspire
and influence each other and become increasingly similar. National and

"' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948). It is perhaps the most important document, excepting only the U.N.
Charter.
32 Under customary international law, a state is obligated to treat foreign nationals in
accordance with an international standard of justice, and is responsible to the state of the
person's nationality for any violations of that standard. The state of nationality is entitled to
afford the person its diplomatic protection. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 711.
" It has not, as is commonly believed, drawn on "communism." In other words, "not
Marx, but Bismarck's" (the Prussian Iron Chancellor who in the 19th Century established the
rudiments of a welfare state).
' Human rights are moral-political claims by an individual against his/her society.
Originating in the 17th century, the idea of rights was adopted in eighteenth century
constitutions, notably those of the United States (and its constituent states) and of France, and
others followed their lead. Constitutional polities, notably those of the United States and its
states, developed the idea of rights in their constitutional jurisprudence. Inevitably, in
recognizing human rights and attempting to define and catalogue them, international law had
to look at national constitutions and their developments.
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international rights systems govern the same persons and the same activities
and interests, serve the same purposes, pursue the same values. The state
system of independent, impermeable states has a new face, and international
law, once shielded from national legal systems, has important new constitutional law features.
ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Enforcement has always been seen as the weak link in the international
legal system, and it is surely the weak link of international human rights law.
Resistance to "enforcement" is the last bastion of "sovereignty," and efforts
to achieve new means of enforcement have seen the least progress in the
movement to shed some old state values in order to promote human values.
But there has been some progress in enforcement of international law
generally, and human rights law has been a particular focus for developing
novel inducements to comply.
The international state system, we know, has never sought to develop an
executive arm or a comprehensive judiciary to enforce international law and
obligations.
Instead, international law is maintained by "horizontal
enforcement": states are induced to honor their obligations by various
political forces, including the anticipated reaction of the state victim of a
violation. The U.N. Security Council, by its authority to maintain international peace and security, can in effect enforce the law of the U.N. Charter
outlawing the use of force, but the Council was not intended to be, and has
not become, a police body to enforce international law generally. The
International Court of Justice is finally, after 50 years, busy, but it hardly
provides a pervasive, comprehensive judicial system to enforce international
law. A largely unofficial network of arbitration and other dispute-settlement
arrangements contributes importantly to the rule of law in transnational
affairs, but does not add up to an enforcement system.
Perhaps because of the special character of the international law of human
rights, because the victims of violations are not states but the violating state's
own inhabitants, "horizontal enforcement" is generally inapplicable and the
international system has had to develop an "enforcement system," largely
unprecedented. Skeptics scoff at the primitive character of "human rights
enforcement," but even "self-reporting," the requirement that a state party to
a covenant or convention report on its compliance to a committee established
pursuant to the treaty, is a derogation from "sovereignty." Accepting the
obligation to report admits that it is the business of other states whether the
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reporting state is respecting the law. An increasingly activist Human Rights
Committee3 5 continues to confront protests from "sovereignty." Moreover,
nearly 80 states, more than half the states parties to the Covenant, more than
a third of the states of the world, have adhered to the Protocol, thereby
submitting to international "adjudication" by the Human Rights Committee
of complaints by their own citizens. More that 70 states have submitted in
principle to investigation (surely an intrusion upon "sovereignty") under the
Convention Against Torture.' In major regions of the world (Europe, the
Americas), states have submitted to comprehensive systems of enforcement
by commission, court, and political bodies, unthinkable to "sovereignty" just
a few years ago. Also, states that only recently were themselves shouting
"sovereignty" are now clamoring to be admitted to the European institutions,
to be subject to screening and judgment by the European Commission and
adjudication by the European Court. Slowly, other regions (Africa, parts of
Asia), may yet follow that path away from "sovereignty."
There has also been enforcement by individual states. In principle,
"diplomatic protection" is no longer for nationals only. In principle, I
believe, a state party to a multilateral treaty can offer diplomatic protection
to a person whose rights are violated by another state party.37 In principle,
any state can "protect" any victim of a violation of non-conventional law that
creates obligations "erga omnes.- 3 8 All states have "intervened," and have
called on others to intervene, to enforce the non-conventional prohibition
against apartheid,as shown by the decades of pressure for sanctions against
South Africa. Long before the U.S. Congress legislated sanctions against
apartheid,it enacted laws to deny foreign assistance and the transfer or sale
of arms to governments guilty of consistent patterns of gross violations of

35

Created pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
17, at Part IV, arts. 28-45.
' Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 20, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984), reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1987) (entered into force June 26, 1987).
17 Surely, if a convention has an "International Court of Justice" clause, any state party
can bring to the Court any dispute with another party as to the application or interpretation
of the convention.
38 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (BeIg. & Sp.), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Second
Phase) (Judgment of Feb. 5).
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internationally recognized human rights.3 9
Human rights law is monitored also, in various forms and degrees, by
political bodies, from the U.N. General Assembly to the U.N. Human Rights
Commission (and its rapporteurs), and since early 1994 by the new U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights.4 In recent years, international
concern for human rights has led to even more "intrusive enforcement," more
stringent derogations from "sovereignty." Some violations, too many in our
day, are grave enough to threaten international peace and security. Indeed,
the concept of "international peace and security" has been expanded by
concern for human rights. Local conditions, local atrocities were held to
threaten international peace and security in Somalia, in Bosnia and in
Cambodia; frustration of democracy has been the basis of sanctions against
Haiti.41 Collective humanitarian intervention is now normal, giving no heed
to cries of "sovereignty."
CONCLUSION

Law professors are a conservative lot. We teach what we were taught, and
what we have long taught. Officials, citizens, think what they have long
thought. Perhaps it is time for us to notice, to help others take note, that the
international system has changed, that international law has changed, that
they are no longer mesmerized by the shibboleth of "sovereignty." Above
all, it should be recognized, "sovereignty" is not a right to insist on anarchy;
surely, it includes the right to consent to be governed, to seek good
international governance.4 2
Human rights have revolutionized the international system and internation-

The Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5002 (1988) (repealed 1993);
compare, e.g., The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,22 U.S.C. § 2151n (1988) (§ 116 codified
as amended) with Section 502B, 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988) and other legislation in
SuBcoMMrrrEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS & INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS (1983).
' The office was established by resolution of the U.N. General Assembly. High
Commissionerfor the Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, G.A. Res. 141, U.N.
GAOR, 48th Sess., 85th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/141 (1994).
,' Louis Henkin, HumanitarianIntervention, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE
NEXT CENTURY, supra note 1.
4
In the United States, "We the people" asserted sovereignty not to maintain their natural
liberty ("sovereignty") so as to be free from government, but to form and consent to a "more
perfect union." U.S. CONST., pmbl.
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al law. The law now reflects human values in addition to state values, or
allows human values to modify state values. We have seen a revolution in
the content of international law to include a growing field directly relevant
to the lives of five billion people, every one of them now a "subject" of
international law. We have changed how international law is made: treaties
are still the principal way to make law, but states have made non-conventional constitutional law to ordain basic values. Law is generally still made by
states and requires state consent, but an occasional state cannot veto law that
reflects the contemporary international political-moral intuition. We have
drawn the content of the new international law from new sources, from
national constitutional sources. On the horizon of the new century is
international commitment to "constitutionalism," constitutional government,
and the rule of law.
We have also revolutionized law enforcement. States can be shamed, and
the system resorts increasingly to mobilizing shame. But there is also more
"hard-nosed," more "real politik" enforcement, by adjudication,4 3 and by
state sanctions. When violations are grave enough to threaten international
peace and security, there may be international sanctions and international
tribunals; even collective military intervention under U.N. (or regional)
authority cannot be excluded.
I do not wish to exaggerate. The changes I have identified are large in
concept but still small in fact. The political system is still more sensitive to
military and economic power than to human values. There is still resistance
to human rights law, even after the Communist world disappeared, even after
the Cold War ended. At the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna,
1993) some states led the attack on the idea of human rights, and particularly
on its enforcement, under the banner of "sovereignty" (or of cultural
relativism, a euphemistic synonym). Resistance to establishing the Office of
U.N. High Commissioner did not succeed, but became resistance to giving
the High Commissioner a broad mandate and adequate resources. But the
change of half a century is real, permanent, irreversible. There can only be
more of it, which bodes better for human values and for human beings in the
next century. 44

43 In addition to adjudication by European and American human rights courts, look at
national cases, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
" The law and politics of human rights are not the only evidence of the erosion of
"sovereignty" in international life. It was signaled, perhaps too subtly to be noted, when the
U.N. Charter was ordained by the "We the peoples" (instead of by "We the governments")
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STATE "SOVEREIGNTY"

A last word: I have stressed resistance by states that do not respect human
rights, that flout its values, that resist its international enforcement. But there
is resistance to international law and enforcement, cries of "sovereignty,"
even by countries that respect human rights and have effective national
systems for their enforcement. The United States, too, invokes sovereignty
as the text (or pretext) for resisting international governance, for noncooperation, for "isolationism," for unilateralism, not the least on human
rights issues.45
That, too, I hope, will change. The United States set an example for
others with bills of rights, with a constitutional tradition, constitutional
institutions, constitutional methodology. We gave the world judicial review,
the courts as the last resort for the individual and the bulwark of his/her
rights, and the courts as the engine for continuing constitutional modernization. But we have been less willing to learn from others. We, too, have to
accept international standards, the expression of the contemporary moral
intuition, when they are higher than ours, e.g., to outlaw capital punishment
for juvenile crimes, or to protect against inhuman or degrading treatment.'
We have to pay a decent respect to the opinions of mankind by submitting
to international scrutiny (e.g., by the Human Rights Committee, pursuant to
the Protocol), to the International Court of Justice, to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. We, too, exercising our sovereignty, must consent
to be governed and help achieve good international governance for living in
a decent world.

of the member states. It was signaled by the quest for more effective international
governance during the years immediately following the Second World War. The United
Nations' deeper concern with conditions inside countries includes not only local effects on
international conditions, e.g., the environment, but also local conditions such as health, food,
education, population controls, the economic and social development of individuals, groups
and societies, and quality of life generally. Local non-governmental organizations have
become part of the international political system, integral to international governance.
4 We even invoke our constitutional system, the law-making power of Congress, as a
reason for refusing to conclude treaties or to have them "self-executing," though the
Constitution expressly provides for law-making by treaty. U.S. CoNsT. art VI; see, e.g., the
reservations attached to U.S. ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 138 CoNG. REC. § 4781 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification
of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995).
46See U.S. reservations, supra note 45. See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989).

